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1. Sanctity of Life is true.  At least for those 
humans that can have conscious experiences, 
and, perhaps, for fetuses too.
2. Severely cognitively impaired humans are 
in the imago Dei.
3. It might be morally impermissible to cease 
care.  This seems bad, but there may be ways 
out of this problem.
4. The lives of “mystics” might be more 
morally valuable than the lives of “non-
mystics”.  If “e’s” happen more among some 
group of people a than among b, aren’t the 
lives of the people in a more valuable than 
those in b? This seems counter-intuitive, but it 
might be okay to bite this bullet.  If not, there 
may be ways out of this problem.
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1. All conscious humans and entities that will be 
conscious humans in the future can have an 
aesthetic experience of God. (Luther)
2. No non-human animals can have an aesthetic 
experience of God.
3. Thus, all conscious humans and entities that will be 
conscious humans in the future, and no non-human 
animals can have an aesthetic experience of God. 
(1,2)
4. For any conscious human or entity that will be a 
conscious human  in the future p, it is causally 
possible for p to have an aesthetic experience of 
God, and for any non-human animal q, it is not 
causally possible for q to have an aesthetic 
experience of God. (3)
5. Some aesthetic experiences of God are immense 
goods for those who have aesthetic experiences of 
God.
6. If some event in p’s life e is good for p, then e
makes p’s life more morally valuable than it would 
have been, all other things being equal, if e were 
not an event in p’s life.
7. If (4), (5), and (6), then iD’ is possibly true:
iD’: For any conscious human or entity that will be 
a conscious human in the future p, p bears the 
property iD.  Thus, it is causally possible for p to 
have an extrinsically good aesthetic experience of 
God e. p’s possibly having an e makes p’s future l
ife more morally valuable than the lives of 
non-human animals q for which it is not causally 
possible for q to have an extrinsically good 
aesthetic experience of God.
8. So, iD’ is possibly true. (4,5,6,7)
• iD’ is a property that:
a) qualitatively separates all human persons from 
all non-human animals
b) makes human persons of far greater moral 
worth than non-human animals.
So, the Sanctity of Life doctrine is defensible.
• Some bioethicists, like Helga Kuhse and Peter 
Singer, question the defensibility of the Sanctity of 
Life doctrine
• According to Kuhse and Singer, the doctrine 
depends on the attribution of moral status to a 
morally irrelevant property: Species
• But resourcing Martin Luther’s conception of imago 
Dei and the Deprivation Thesis may provide morally 
relevant support for Sanctity of Life
• Traditionally, the Sanctity of Life doctrine has 
depended upon the imago Dei for support
• Accordingly, the imago Dei is supposed to be a 
property that:
a) qualitatively separates all human persons from 
all non-human animals
b) makes human persons of far greater moral 
worth than non-human animals.
My solution:
• I will look to the theology of Martin Luther as well as 
the deprivation thesis, and argue that Luther’s 
doctrine of imago Dei is successful in meeting the 
joint conditions challenged by Kuhse and Singer, 
and successful in showing why it might be ipso facto
morally worse to kill a human than a non-human 
animal. 
Luther:
“Therefore my understanding of the image of 
God is this: that Adam had it in his being and 
that he not only knew God and believed that He 
was good, but that he also lived in a life that was 
wholly godly.”
“But Adam lived in supreme bliss and in freedom 
from fear; he was not afraid of fire, of water, or of 
the other discomforts…”
Peterson:
“First of all, Luther argues that the image of God 
provided Adam with the clearest and purest 
experience of life.  This applied to both his 
spiritual and physical existence.  Second, Adam 
had no fear of death or other anxiety.”
My Formulation of Luther’s imago Dei:
iD: For any creature p, p is in the imago Dei IFF it is 
causally possible for p to have an aesthetic 
experience of God e.
The Deprivation Thesis
• On the Deprivation Thesis, death is bad for a 
person because, in Jeff McMahan’s words, “it 
[excludes] what would be good for a person –
namely continuing to exist.”
• Thus, if a person dies, she is deprived of the good 
life she would have had had she continued living.
• To state this in a non-decorative terms:
If p dies at t and thereby goes out of existence, p
fails to incur any goods and harms that she would 
have incurred after t in the closest possible world in 
which p does not die at t.
So, killing is pro tanto wrong on the deprivation thesis 
because it causes the deprivation of goods.
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